


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SPECIAL REPORT

INDIA AND PAKISTAN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
OFFICE OF CURRENT INTELLIGENCE

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SECRET

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN REMAIN AT AN IMPASSE

Relations between India and Pakistan, never good and usually fluctuating between bad and worse, are again deteriorating. In the past, tempers have flared most often over the reopening of some wound left over from the 1947 partition of British India or new abrasions produced by differing policies toward powers outside the South Asian area. In the present instance, however, long-standing Indo-Pakistani frustrations have been aggravated again by a number of frequently unrelated pinpricks.

These pinpricks have related primarily to India's policies toward both the international and "domestic" aspects of the Kashmir question. They have in recent weeks been aggravated by a series of border incidents, not along the normally troubled cease-fire line in Kashmir but rather along India's international boundaries with both East and West Pakistan. The countries now appear further away than ever from a productive dialogue which could mark the first step toward a durable accommodation.

Kashmir--International

While Nehru lived, prospects for a resolution of India's and Pakistan's conflicting claims to the state of Jammu and Kashmir rested almost exclusively in his hands. He was strong enough to have been able to sell his own countrymen a solution acceptable to Pakistan, but neither his mind nor his heart was willing. Not until 1958, when Ayub Khan came to power in Karachi with the solid backing of the army, was there anyone in Pakistan strong enough to carry off an equitable settlement. Ayub did make several efforts, but they all foundered

on the rock of Nehruvian obduracy.

During the last five months of his life, Nehru seemed to show some slight degree of flexibility regarding affairs inside Indian-ruled Kashmir. An easing of police state measures there brought some guarded hope in Pakistan. The principal result of Nehru's actions, however, was a mutual moratorium on invective for some months after his death, while Pakistan waited to see whether the moderate Shastri would pick up where Nehru seemed to leave off, and while Shastri offered conciliatory words but

SECRET

SECRET

focused mainly on consolidating his own position as Nehru's heir.

Ten months have passed since Nehru's death, however, and there has been no movement toward a settlement. Indeed, Shastri's remarks during a brief stopover in Karachi last fall appear to have conveyed to Pakistanis only that the new Indian leader was well motivated but felt too weak politically to come to grips with the hard decisions necessary to resolve the dispute.

All the while, the instances of firing across the UN-supervised cease-fire line in Kashmir have continued, occasionally involving hundreds on each side. The rate of incidents for 1964 reached a new high.

Kashmir--"Domestic"

Policies pursued by each country within the portion of Kashmir it rules bring repercussions internationally insofar as they affirm or erode the "disputed status" which Kashmir enjoys under international law and United Nations resolutions.

On the Pakistani side, the fiction of a quasi-independent state of Azad (free) Kashmir is no longer as serious a factor in Pakistani policy and propaganda as it was in the early 1950s. Azad Kashmir is firmly controlled by Pakistan. Its continued existence serves to support the "disputed" status of the entire area, and it also provides the manpower to fill

out 18 locally recruited battalions manning the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line.

Whereas Pakistani policy toward Azad Kashmir has played no part in recent years in Indian attitudes and propaganda, New Delhi's administrative policy toward that portion of Kashmir under Indian jurisdiction has been the subject of bitter Pakistani recriminations. Pakistan holds that because Kashmir is a disputed territory, both countries are bound to preserve its separateness and to avoid acts aimed at absorption. Indian policy from 1953 on, however, has been gradually to make over the area into a fully integrated Indian state by progressive application of bits and pieces of the Indian



Ayub and Shastri meeting in Karachi in late 1964.

SECRET

SECRET

constitution and by bringing the state's administrative and political practices into conformity with those in the other states in the Indian union.

Thus by now, most of the Indian constitution applies to the state, India's courts have been given jurisdiction there, the civil services have lost their separate identity, and, most recently, provision has been made for the imposition of direct rule from New Delhi should the administration of the state break down.

Even when New Delhi was observing a "special" status for Kashmir in the Indian union, Indian control in the coveted Vale of Kashmir rested on Kashmiri puppets and Indian bayonets. Over the years, however, Indian administrative actions have sought to improve on the legal and political basis for the power while keeping a tight lid on the explosive potential of Kashmir's predominantly Muslim population.

Relaxation and Reaction

In a shift of policy early in 1964, India began to relax its police controls. Strong man Bakshi Ghulam Muhammad was given his walking papers after 10 years of despotic but reliable rule. Shastri, then an aide to Nehru, put the more compliant Ghulam Muhammad Sadiq into Bakshi's vacated chair, and directed a liberalization of controls. Even the charismatic Sheikh Abdullah, imprisoned for nearly 11 years, was released and began to breathe life into Kashmiri politics.

In many of these actions, the Pakistani Government had cause for rejoicing. Its official attitude was hopeful as it watched political life resume in the Vale and take up the causes of Muslims disenchanted with and hateful of Hindu Indian rule; it had everything to gain in offering to meet Abdullah, for though he had betrayed Muslim Pakistan once when he took Kashmir into India, he now offered only a marginal and long-range threat to Pakistani interest in ultimately ruling the state. His advocacy of self-determination reinforced Pakistan's immediate claims against Indian rule.

But the luster soon dimmed. By late 1964 it became apparent that Abdullah was getting nowhere in his pressure for Kashmiri self-determination. In New Delhi, the new Congress leadership seemed embarked on a campaign to cut him down to size, and thus to deny him the power to apply pressure on New Delhi. Emergency powers to run the state from Delhi were put on the books. The ruling National Conference was converted into a state branch of India's Congress Party. New Delhi is reported planning even to discard the uniquely Kashmiri titles for Kashmir's ceremonial chief of state and its effective head of government in favor of the titles "governor" and "chief minister" in use in the other Indian states.

In recent months the situation has become increasingly tense. Abdullah was granted permission to undertake a pilgrimage

SECRET

SECRET

to Mecca in February and is still traveling. In his absence, more than 165 of his followers have been jailed for their efforts to organize Kashmiri dissidence and, especially, to prevent Muslims from joining the new Congress Party unit in the state. Abdullah's return could spark additional demonstrations and a re-imposition of the even stiffer police controls of the Bakshi era. At some point, however, Indian "hard" policy will face the same bankruptcy which led Shastri and Nehru to gamble on a soft line just a year ago.

Pakistan's reaction to the re-emergence of this hard line has been predictably harsh, reflecting not only frustration with India's imperious handling of "internal" Kashmiri affairs and with India's further erosion of Kashmiri separateness, but also a sense of letdown that the tenuous signs of Indian flexibility during Nehru's last days and in Shastri's first months have brought no visible change to the situation. Ayub and his foreign minister have both publicly stressed sympathy with their oppressed Muslim brethren in Kashmir in recent weeks. They may in time be moved to provide direct and substantial assistance to Kashmir's disaffected population, with or without Abdullah's leadership or consent, as the only way to arrest further moves at integration and to bring effective international pressure on the Indians to seek a settlement.

The Border Incidents

New border incidents have recently occurred in the swampy Rann of Kutch, at the point where the western Indian state of Gujarat abuts the Sind border of Pakistan, and to the east where Indian and Pakistani enclaves in each other's territories have long been a source of friction and bloodshed.


In the Rann of Kutch, the Pakistanis appear to be at fault, having deliberately moved across a portion of poorly marked border to occupy an abandoned fort site well inside Indian territory. The terrain is difficult and the Indian Army reckons it would take more than two battalions to dislodge the Pakistani force. Thus far the situation has generated more heat than fire.

More tension has been produced by recent events along the Bengal border, where Indians have moved to curtail access to a Pakistani enclave--Dahagram--separated from East Pakistan by less than 200 yards of Indian territory. The result has been indiscriminate firing into and around the enclave by armed police on both sides, coupled with Indian forays and communal violence inside it. Lesser incidents have occurred nearby.

Pakistan has blown up the bloodshed at Dahagram beyond all

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INDIA AND PAKISTAN



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relevance to the local situation or to the facts of the situation as reported by its own intelligence service. It seems clear, however, that Indians did fire first, and that is the point of departure in the Pakistani propaganda campaign. Moreover, Pakistan is using the incident in its argument against the West's provision of military aid to India, claiming--erroneously--that the Indian forces on the scene are equipped with Western arms and seeking to point up both the deviousness of the Hindu and the alleged hollowness of Western assurances that India's Western equipment will be used only against the Chinese.

The worst now appears to be over, and the enclave--one of nearly 200 such anomalies left over from prepartition jurisdictions of petty princes--will eventually be involved in an exchange for which a government-to-government agreement has existed for some years. Until the exchange finally takes place, however, each enclave poses the potential for Dohadram-type incidents.

The Nagas

Yet another pinprick in the northeast has been Pakistan's efforts to capitalize on Indian difficulties in bringing the decade-long rebellion by Naga tribesmen to an end.

In recent weeks, a band of Naga insurgents--which, like two smaller groups before it, was supplied and trained in

East Pakistan--has made its way back to Nagaland via Burma. The Indians, now negotiating with the Nagas under a tenuous truce, are particularly sensitive to this latest Pakistani provocation.

Conclusion

The mood in both capitals is uncompromising. The Shastri government, beset with abundant domestic problems, acts as though it wished that Pakistan would just go away. Its policies on the international aspects of the Kashmir question are essentially reactive, since it has what it wants and thus desires to prolong the status quo. Moreover, it remains to be seen to what extent Shastri is master of his own house. Whatever his private sentiments on the desirability for Indo-Pakistani amity--and it is widely assumed that he would make some move to achieve it if he could--he seems unable and unwilling to challenge those in his own party who have made a political career out of Indo-Pakistani enmity. These forces represent both the left and the right in the Congress Party, and most other parties, thus transcending ideological bias and reflecting the Hindu communal outlook of most Indians.

In Pakistan, President Ayub, the undisputed master of his domain, now is charting new foreign relationships aimed at giving Pakistan a greater sense of security vis-a-vis the Indian behemoth. He has been quite adept and successful thus far in improving his relationship

SECRET

SECRET

with Afghanistan, in projecting his ideas of regional cooperation into the CENTO area, in asserting his "independence" from cold war alliances, and in making the appropriate noises and bows in Afro-Asian circles, especially among militants like Indonesia. Moreover, in his bitter reaction to Western military assistance to India, he has fashioned a new variant of nonalignment, virtually as selective and as mixed as India's has become. He has thus been able to reduce the scope of his ties with the United States to some basic essentials while at the same time courting favor with Peiping and the militant Afro-Asians as a counter to India's exploitation of its relationship with the USSR and with the West.

But his major foreign policy problem remains India, and the key element in that relationship is spelled Kashmir. Here he has little more than a string of frustrations to show for his efforts.

Neither country is disposed toward full-fledged military conflict to resolve its big problems with the other, or the parade of pinpricks in their

day-to-day dealings. The weight of military power rests with India and both sides know this, despite the bellicose threats that periodically fill the air. Rather, the prevailing sentiment in the two capitals is one of despair for any relief from Indian inflexibility and Pakistani harping.

Strong leaders come and go; weak leaders come and go; yet the impasse remains, and the passage of time seems to have had no effect. In fact, the younger generation, born after the advent of independence and the horrors of partition, seem just as fixed as their forebears have been for the simple yet complex reason that people on both sides of the border still regard nationals on the other side first as Muslims or Hindus, and only then as Pakistanis or Indians. The national entities of Pakistan and India still carry the communal connotation which gave them their birth, and neither the Muslims nor the Hindus have ever given the other sufficient reason to develop an atmosphere conducive to trust and good faith in which national issues can be discussed--and dealt with--purely as national issues. (SECRET NO FOREIGN DISSEM)

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